Application Of Summary Judgments (Post-5/1/21)

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510 was amended, effective May 1, 2021. The newly amended rule adopted almost all the text of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.  Over the past year, a number of cases have made their way to the appellate courts giving us insight into how the courts interpret and apply the new rule. The following probate cases are instructive:

 

In Jones v. Ervolino, 339 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2022), Jones filed a petition for administration in probate after the decedent’s death claiming he was the sole beneficiary under the decedent’s will and sought to be appointed as the PR of the estate. Kathryn Ervolino, the decedent’s niece, filed a separate petition for administration and sought to be appointed as the PR of the estate, claiming the decedent died with no valid will. Kathryn Ervolino subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the will was invalid as a matter of law thus the estate should proceed by intestate administration. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The order merely provided that “Kathryn Ervolino’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.”  

The appellate court reversed and remanded for entry of an order that complies with the newly amended rule which provides in part that “the court shall state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.” This obligation is mandatory. The court held: “To comply with this requirement, it will not be enough for the court to make a conclusory statement that there is or is not a genuine dispute as to a material fact. The court must state the reasons for its decision with enough specificity to provide useful guidance to the parties and, if necessary, to allow for appellate review.” [citations omitted]. A mere pronouncement the court has granted or denied such a motion fails to comply with the rule as it does not contain reasons for granting or denying the motion. Here, neither the trial court’s oral pronouncement nor its written order offer the necessary specificity to provide useful guidance or allow for appellate review. “On a systemic level . . . this requirement is critical to ensuring that Florida courts embrace the federal summary judgment standard in practice and not just on paper.” …We are well aware and sympathetic of the daily burdens a trial court endures in carrying out the administration of justice. Busy trial judges need not write lengthy opinions, but must take reasonable steps to ensure the parties and appellate courts are informed as to the reasons for granting or denying the motion on which their rulings rest under our new standard.

In Rich v. Narog, 2022 Fla. App. LEXIS 6431; 47 Fla. L. Weekly D 1933; 2022 WL 4360601(Fla. 3rd DCA 9/21/22), the PR filed a petition for discharge and a final accounting which referenced thirteen payments to different creditors totaling approximately $715,000, a $329,000 payment to a creditor, and a $1,368,675 payment to himself for a boat loan. The beneficiaries filed an objection to the petition for discharge and to the final accounting and sought to hold the PR personally liable and surcharge him for the alleged errant disbursements.

The beneficiaries filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, the PR filed a memorandum of law opposing the beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment and a supporting affidavit.  The trial court conducted a hearing on the beneficiaries’ summary judgment. At the hearing, the beneficiaries’ counsel argued that, under the new summary judgment standard, the PR’s affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude entry of summary judgment in their favor. The trial court agreed and surcharged the PR approximately $2.54 million for the alleged wrongfully paid debts. The appellate court, in affirming the summary judgment, reasoned:

The issue we must decide is whether, under the new summary judgment standard, the personal representative’s affidavit is legally sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to (i) whether the boat loan was a liability of the decedent or, as the personal representative asserts, a liability of the decedent’s wholly-owned corporation, and (ii) whether estate assets were used to repay the loan.

We recognize that, in all likelihood, under Florida’s former summary judgment standard, the affidavit would have been sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, thus precluding the entry of summary judgment. [citations omitted]. Florida’s new standard, however, placed a higher burden on the personal representative, one that the personal representative’s affidavit did not meet.

“In Florida it will no longer be plausible to maintain that ‘the existence of any competent evidence creating an issue of fact, however credible or incredible, substantial or trivial, stops the inquiry and precludes summary judgment, so long as the ‘slightest doubt’ is raised.'”[citations omitted]. Under the federal summary judgment standard that is now applicable in Florida’s state courts, where, as here, the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a dispositive issue at trial, the moving party need only demonstrate “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” [citations omitted].

Under the new standard, once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. [Citation omitted]. Specifically, it is incumbent upon the nonmoving party to come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating that a genuine issue of fact exists as to an element necessary for the non-movant to prevail at trial. Id. at 324; See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c)(1)(A) (“A party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]”). Importantly, though, “[i]f the evidence [presented by the nonmovant] is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” [citations omitted].

The trial court, therefore, must determine — as is the case with a motion for a directed verdict — whether the nonmovant’s “evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” [citations omitted]. That is to say, the nonmovant’s evidence must be of sufficient weight and quality that “reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that [the nonmovant] is entitled to a verdict.” [citation omitted]. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'”[citations omitted].

* * * *

Hence, in opposing the beneficiaries’ summary judgment motion, the personal representative had the burden to overcome the presumption by establishing, with evidence of sufficient weight and quality, that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude both that (i) the boat loan was not a liability of the decedent, and (ii) estate assets were not used to repay the loan. [citations omitted].

 

Other than the personal representative’s self-serving affidavit, though, there is no summary judgment evidence supporting the personal representative’s bald assertions contained therein that he made the boat loan to the decedent’s wholly-owned corporation and that no estate assets were actually used to repay the personal representative for the boat loan….[N]o documents or other evidence that would normally substantiate such assertions…are appended to the personal representative’s affidavit. Nor does the personal representative’s affidavit provide any explanation for the absence of any such memorialization documents. Similarly, the personal representative’s affidavit does not describe the terms of the personal representative’s loan to the corporation, the identity of the boat’s buyer, the precise date of the boat’s sale from the corporation to the buyer, when the sales proceeds were received by the corporation, when the sales proceeds were deposited into the estate account, or any other “specific, discrete facts of the who, what, when, and where variety” that give the personal representative’s affidavit the type of probative value necessary to defeat the beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment. [citations omitted]

Because the personal representative submitted only an affidavit in opposition to the beneficiaries’ motion for summary judgment, his affidavit must “set forth specific facts to show why there is an issue for trial.” [citations omitted].  While the personal representative’s affidavit includes some specifics explaining what the personal representative allegedly did and why he did it, the affidavit’s lack of specificity regarding the critical details related to (i) the personal representative’s alleged loan to the decedent’s corporation, (ii) the corporation’s alleged purchase of the boat with the loan proceeds, (iii) the corporation’s alleged sale of the boat to the third-party Buyer, and (iv) the personal representative’s alleged deposit of boat sales proceeds into the estate account, render the personal representative’s affidavit conclusory. Under Florida’s new summary judgment standard, the affidavit is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. [citations omitted].

In sum, the summary judgment record, taken as a whole, is devoid of critical, significantly probative details that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude both that (i) the boat loan was an obligation of the decedent’s wholly-owned corporation, rather than of the decedent, and (ii) no estate assets were used to repay the boat loan, so as to overcome the presumption established by the summary judgment evidence that the surcharge was proper. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s summary judgment surcharging the personal representative for the repayment of the boat loan.

 

 

 

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